THE CREDENTIAL TIME BOMB: Why Long-Lived Cloud Credentials Are Your Biggest Identity Risk in 2025

Executive Summary

Across AWS, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure environments in Australia and globally, 59% of IAM users maintain access keys that have never expired—credentials that have been active for more than one year. These long-lived credentials represent a silent but catastrophic vulnerability in your cloud infrastructure. When credentials with persistent, unchanging authentication tokens are exposed—via GitHub repositories, container images, build logs, or compromised developer machines—attackers gain a direct, undetectable pathway to your most critical data and systems. For Australian organisations operating under the mandatory 72-hour ransomware reporting requirement (effective May 30, 2025) and strict Privacy Act breach notification rules, a credential compromise is not just a security incident—it is a regulatory nightmare. This blog explores why long-lived credentials have become the primary attack vector for identity-based breaches, how red teams exploit them during penetration tests, and what you must do today to eliminate this ticking time bomb.

Cloud credential risk visualization featuring long-lived credentials exposed within network topology

The Scale of the Problem: Data That Demands Action

The Datadog 2025 State of Cloud Security Report reveals a stark reality that extends far beyond perception. In the last 12 months:

  • 59% of AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) users maintained access keys older than one year.
  • 55% of Google Cloud service accounts possessed credentials that never rotated.
  • 40% of Microsoft Entra ID applications had access keys active for over 12 months.

These are not one-off oversights. They represent systemic, organization-wide failures in credential lifecycle management. Many of these aged credentials are also unused and forgotten—sitting dormant in configurations, automations, and legacy integrations—making them both a security blind spot and a compliance violation waiting to be discovered.

In Australia, where identity-based attacks dominate the threat landscape, this credential sprawl has direct business implications. Long-lived credentials remain the root cause of publicly documented cloud data breaches globally. A single exposure can cascade into a complete infrastructure compromise, lateral movement across cloud environments, data exfiltration, and regulatory action.

Why Long-Lived Credentials Are the Attacker's Weapon of Choice

Long-lived credentials are attractive attack targets for several reasons that red teams exploit during penetration assessments:

  • Static and unchanging: Once obtained, they remain valid indefinitely, providing persistence without requiring re-authentication attempts that might trigger alerts.
  • High discovery value: They are frequently embedded in source code, Slack conversations, CI/CD logs, container images, and unencrypted backups—making them easier to find than live authentication sessions.
  • Low detection risk: Unlike interactive authentication or multi-factor authentication (MFA) events, credential use from legitimate automation sources blends into normal traffic.
  • Privilege escalation potential: Service account credentials often carry elevated permissions, enabling immediate privilege escalation and lateral movement.

When a red team discovers exposed AWS access keys in a GitHub repository, the test simulates exactly what an external attacker would do: use those keys to enumerate your cloud environment, discover overprivileged roles, access sensitive data, and establish persistence. The threat is not theoretical—it is operationalized every day.


How Long-Lived Credentials Compromise Your Cloud Security Posture

Where They Hide: The Four Common Exposure Vectors

1. Source Code Repositories

Developers often hardcode credentials to accelerate testing or troubleshooting. Even after deletion, these keys remain in repository history unless actively scrubbed. Attackers use GitHub dorks and similar search techniques to discover exposed AWS keys, API credentials, and database passwords within minutes of a commit.

2. Container Images and Build Artifacts

CI/CD pipelines inadvertently capture credentials in Docker images, build logs, and application artifacts. Once a container is deployed across multiple environments, the embedded credential grants access to the entire container ecosystem. A pentester scanning your container registry will identify and exploit these in seconds.

3. Embedded in Application Code and Environment Variables

Legacy automation often passes credentials as environment variables or in plaintext configuration files. Although modern secrets management tools exist, many organizations still rely on ad-hoc credential handling that bypasses centralized vaults.

4. Forgotten in Logs and Backup Systems

Credentials are logged during debugging, embedded in hardcoded configurations, or captured in application memory dumps. Attackers can use credential dumping utilities to extract these after gaining initial system access.


The Penetration Testing Perspective: How Red Teams Exploit Credential Risks

During a cloud penetration test, credential discovery is typically the second phase after initial reconnaissance. Here is how red teams and adversaries attack your environment:

Phase 1: Reconnaissance

  • Enumerate publicly exposed S3 buckets, GitHub repositories, and cloud resources.
  • Search for exposed credentials using Shodan, Binary Edge, or GitHub-specific search tools.

Phase 2: Credential Harvesting

  • Extract credentials from discovered sources (repositories, build logs, support documentation).
  • Validate harvested credentials by attempting authentication to cloud platforms.
  • Document access levels and permissioned resources.

Phase 3: Lateral Movement

  • Use harvested credentials to enumerate additional cloud resources, IAM roles, and trust relationships.
  • Identify overprivileged service accounts that can reach sensitive data.
  • Escalate privileges using cloud-native enumeration scripts or directory attack tools.

Phase 4: Persistence and Impact

  • Establish backdoor access or deploy long-term persistence mechanisms.
  • Exfiltrate sensitive data such as customer information, API keys, and intellectual property.
  • Create additional credential caches to maintain access even if the initial compromise is detected.

Real-World Breach Case Study: Football Australia

A concrete example illustrates the catastrophic impact. During the Football Australia data breach investigation, developers had embedded long-term AWS access keys directly into the website source code. The keys granted unrestricted access to publicly misconfigured S3 buckets containing unencrypted personal data. A single compromised credential became the attack vector for a massive data breach affecting thousands of individuals—and triggered mandatory breach notification obligations to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC).

The breach resulted from a toxic combination of:

  • Hardcoded long-lived credentials in source code (insecure development practice).
  • Overly permissive IAM policies granting full S3 access.
  • Public misconfiguration of S3 buckets (lack of access controls).
  • Absence of credential monitoring or rotation.

This preventable incident demonstrates that credential risk is not just a technical problem—it is a business continuity and regulatory compliance crisis.


Australian Compliance Context: The Regulatory Stakes

Mandatory Ransomware Reporting (72 Hours)

From May 30, 2025, Australian businesses with annual turnover exceeding AUD $3 million must report ransomware and cyber extortion payments to the Department of Home Affairs within 72 hours. A credential compromise that enables ransomware deployment is now a reportable incident with strict timing requirements.

Notifiable Data Breach Scheme (NDB)

Organizations must notify affected individuals and the OAIC of any eligible data breach likely to cause serious harm within 30 calendar days of assessment. The Privacy Act penalties have escalated significantly, with maximum civil penalties reaching AUD $50 million (or three times the benefit of the contravention) for serious invasions of privacy.

ASD Blueprint and Cloud Computing Standards

The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) has issued guidance through the Blueprint for Secure Cloud, which emphasizes risk-managed approaches to cloud security aligned with the Information Security Manual (ISM). From July 1, 2026, government agencies and increasingly, critical infrastructure operators, must comply with the new Cloud Computing Standard.

OAIC Expanded Enforcement Powers

The OAIC can now:

  • Request information about suspected data breaches.
  • Conduct compliance assessments.
  • Issue compulsory compliance notices.
  • Levy medium- and low-level civil penalties without court intervention.

For organizations with compromised credentials leading to data breaches, this means faster regulatory scrutiny, higher penalties, and mandatory public disclosure.


Why Penetration Testing Is Essential for Credential Risk Assessment

A comprehensive penetration test—especially one focused on cloud infrastructure—serves as the only realistic way to validate your credential security posture before attackers do.

What Cloud Penetration Testing Reveals

Credential Exposure Assessment

  • Automated and manual scanning of your cloud environment, repositories, and artifact storage.
  • Discovery of active access keys, API tokens, and service account credentials.
  • Validation of credential age and rotation status.
  • Identification of credentials with excessive permissions (overprivilege analysis).

IAM and Access Control Testing

  • Enumeration of IAM policies, roles, and trust relationships.
  • Identification of overpermissive roles (e.g., AdministratorAccess assigned to non-admin users).
  • Assessment of service account configuration and privilege escalation potential.
  • Testing of cross-account access and assume-role abuse scenarios.

Lateral Movement Simulation

  • Simulated credential harvesting and validation.
  • Testing of privilege escalation paths using harvested credentials.
  • Assessment of network segmentation and API-level access controls.
  • Detection capability validation (determining what telemetry would have been triggered).

Data Perimeter and Restrictive Access Controls

  • Validation of data perimeters—policies that restrict cloud API calls to approved networks and trusted accounts.
  • Testing of resource-level access controls and public access blocks.
  • Assessment of encryption and secret management practices.

Actionable Deliverables from Penetration Testing

  • Risk-ranked findings with exploitation evidence.
  • Remediation roadmaps prioritized by exploitability and business impact.
  • Detection gaps report showing what your security tooling missed.
  • Credential lifecycle recommendations aligned with your architecture and compliance obligations.

Penetration Testing Assessment Components

Assessment Component Objective Expected Outcome
Credential Exposure Scan Identify exposed credentials in repositories, logs, and artifacts. Inventory of discoverable credentials ranked by sensitivity.
IAM Policy Analysis Detect overpermissive roles and trust relationships. Findings of excessive permissions and privilege escalation paths.
Credential Harvesting Simulation Simulate real-world credential theft and validation. Evidence of whether harvested credentials grant access.
Lateral Movement Testing Test privilege escalation and cross-account access. Attack paths from low-privilege to sensitive resources.
Detection Validation Assess whether your security tools detected credential-based attacks. Coverage gaps in logging, monitoring, and alerting.
Remediation Roadmap Prioritize findings by exploitability and business impact. Clear, sequenced recommendations for credential lifecycle improvements.

Best Practices: Eliminating Long-Lived Credentials from Your Cloud Environment

Immediate Actions (0–30 Days)

1. Audit All Active Credentials

Conduct a comprehensive inventory of all AWS IAM users, Google Cloud service accounts, and Azure application identities. Document:

  • Credential creation and last rotation date.
  • Associated permissions and privilege level.
  • Usage patterns (active vs. dormant).
  • Location (embedded in code, logs, or configuration).

2. Implement Credential Rotation Policies

  • Rotate all credentials older than 90 days (ideally 30–45 days for sensitive roles).
  • Establish automated rotation using native tools like AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Google Secret Manager.
  • Document and monitor rotation events in centralized logging.

3. Eliminate Unused Credentials

  • Deactivate and remove service accounts no longer in use.
  • Revoke access for terminated employees and offboarded contractors.
  • Close inactive IAM user accounts with old access keys.

Medium-Term Initiatives (1–3 Months)

4. Transition to Temporary, Short-Lived Credentials

  • Deploy AWS STS and temporary session tokens for human access.
  • Implement AWS IAM Identity Center for centralized federated authentication.
  • Use Google Cloud Workload Identity and Azure Managed Identities for application-to-application access.
  • Enforce MFA for all human access and enable MFA for programmatic access where supported.

5. Centralize Secrets Management

  • Adopt enterprise-grade secrets management solutions (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault).
  • Enforce automatic credential injection into applications and CI/CD pipelines.
  • Implement audit logging for all credential access and usage events.
  • Restrict human access to secrets to emergency scenarios only.

6. Implement Data Perimeters

A data perimeter restricts sensitive cloud API calls to succeed only when made from approved networks, trusted cloud accounts, or legitimate automation services. Even if a credential is compromised, the attacker cannot use it to access sensitive resources outside of approved contexts.

Long-Term Architecture Changes (3–6 Months)

7. Enforce Least Privilege at Scale

  • Review and reduce IAM permissions to match the principle of least privilege.
  • Implement automated permission optimization tools.
  • Establish RBAC governance with quarterly reviews.
  • Use ABAC where supported to enable dynamic, context-aware permissions.

8. Continuous Monitoring and Detection

  • Deploy CSPM tools to detect credential misconfigurations.
  • Implement IAM monitoring to detect anomalous authentication patterns.
  • Enable centralized logging of cloud API activity (CloudTrail, Cloud Logging, Activity Log).
  • Configure alerts for unusual API calls, failed authentication attempts, and privilege escalation attempts.

9. Conduct Regular Penetration Testing

  • Perform cloud-specific penetration tests annually or after significant infrastructure changes.
  • Include credential harvesting and exploitation scenarios in scope.
  • Validate detection and response capabilities through purple-team exercises.
  • Update credential governance policies based on lessons learned.

The Business Case: Why Credential Risk Demands Immediate Board Attention

Financial and Reputational Impact

  • A single credential compromise can lead to a data breach affecting millions of customers, triggering OAIC enforcement and public disclosure.
  • Breach notification and remediation costs can reach millions of dollars in Australia.
  • Regulatory fines under the Privacy Act can exceed AUD $50 million.
  • Incident response, forensics, and remediation further escalate costs.
  • Reputational damage and customer trust erosion can be long-lasting.

Competitive Risk

Organizations that do not actively manage credential lifecycle are more likely to suffer breaches that expose customer data and intellectual property, enable long-term attacker persistence, and result in public disclosure that undermines market position and shareholder confidence.

Compliance and Governance

Australian regulatory bodies—particularly the OAIC and ASD—are increasing enforcement actions against organizations with weak credential governance. Proactive credential management is no longer optional; it is a baseline expectation for regulated entities.


Conclusion: The Time to Act Is Now

Long-lived credentials remain the most cost-effective attack vector for threat actors and the most common root cause of documented cloud data breaches. Over half of organizations continue to rely on credentials that have never rotated—despite the availability of modern, short-lived credential mechanisms.

In Australia, where mandatory breach reporting, Privacy Act enforcement, and ASD compliance requirements converge, credential compromise is no longer just a security issue—it is a board-level business risk.

Your action items:

  • Audit all active cloud credentials and identify those older than 90 days.
  • Remediate by rotating sensitive credentials and removing unused accounts.
  • Architect a transition to temporary, short-lived credentials using managed identity services.
  • Test your credential security posture through a dedicated cloud penetration assessment.
  • Monitor continuously for credential exposure and anomalous access patterns.

Organizations that treat credential lifecycle management as a strategic priority—not just a compliance checkbox—will dramatically reduce their risk of data breach, regulatory enforcement, and operational disruption.


Call to Action

Your cloud credentials are only as secure as your most hidden, least monitored access key. If you are uncertain whether your organization is adequately protecting against credential-based compromise, or if you want to validate your cloud security posture before an attacker does, schedule a consultation with our cloud penetration testing specialists.

We conduct rigorous, authorized assessments that simulate real-world credential harvesting and exploitation scenarios—revealing the gaps that matter most. Our detailed findings and remediation roadmaps help you eliminate long-lived credentials from your environment and implement the controls that prevent breach.

Contact us today to discuss your cloud credential risk assessment and penetration testing engagement.